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Can Animals Act for Reasons?
Abstract
This essay argues that nonlinguistic animals qualify not just for externalist notions of rationality
(maximizing biological fitness or utility), but also for internal ones. They can act for reasons in several
senses: their behaviour is subject to intentional explanations, they can act in the light of reasonsprovided
that the latter are conceived as objective facts rather than subjective mental statesand they can
deliberate. Finally, even if they could not, it would still be misguided to maintain that animals are





























rationality   of   the   kind   favoured   by   biologists   and   economists   (sct.   III).   That 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































any   exercise   of   the   power   to   reflect   on   our   reasons   for   action 
presupposes that we already have such reasons about which we can 
reflect  …   the   kinds   of   reason   that   we   share   with   dolphins   and 
chimpanzees. Did we not share such reasons with [them] we would not 
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postulated   by   most   cognitive   scientists.   They   are   not   constitutive   of   mental   phenomena   as 
determined by our concepts, since not even the subjects themselves are aware of them. Furthermore, 










































I A  Vs (thinks/believes/expects, etc.)  that p
II A  Vs (intends/plans/means, etc.)  to Φ

















12  In  this vein, McDowell  concedes     that  while     features of  the environment can be ‘problems or    
opportunities’ for  an  animal while denying that  the latter ‘conceives  the features as problems or 
opportunities’ (1996: 116). Just so. But if these features provide reasons for acting, as I have urged, 
then this leads to a conclusion McDowell and Hacker resist, namely that animals can act for reasons 
without being able to conceive of them as reasons.
13 Hacker responds ‘I agree with the premises but deny the conclusion’, and goes on to claim that 
there is no reflection on reasons without language (2007: 204n). Unfortunately I don’t see what 
steps of MacIntyre’s argument he has in mind and how his claim undermines them. For the crux of 
MacIntyre’s argument is not that one can reflect on reasons without being able to speak, but rather 
that one can act for reasons without being able to reflect on these reasons.
14 Indeed, there is clear evidence of this moment in footage generously made available to me by 
Carla Crachun from the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig.
15 For comments and suggestions I would like to thank Maria Alvarez, John Hyman, Javier Kalhat 
and Julia Langkau, as well as the participants of the workshop on “Human and Non­Human 
Agency” at the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature at the University of Oslo.
